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RECENT DECISIONS
LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-Electronic Eavesdropping-Verbal evidence of gambling activities obtained without a warrant
by means of an electronic listening device held inadmissable.
CONSTITUTIONAL

Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1968).
Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California for transmitting wagering information by
telephone in violation of a federal statute' proscribing the interstate
transmission of bets or wagers by wire communication. Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which
affirmed. 2 Petitioner then appealed to the United States Supreme Court
which reversed 3 holding that petitioner's conviction, based on recorded
conversations obtained by Government agents without first securing a
search warrant, were improperly admitted into evidence since "the Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording petitioner's
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied . .. and thus
constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." 4
The facts indicated that agents of the F.B.I. had been investigating
petitioner's activities for some time prior to the act in question, and that
their investigation established a strong probability that he was using the
telephone for purposes of conducting illegal gambling activities. He was
observed on several occasions using the same "bank" of three pay telephone booths at approximately the same time every morning. The Government agents placed a sign on one of the three booths saying "Out of
Order" and placed electronic listening and recording devices on top of
the other two telephone booths. The electronic surveillance was confined
to those periods in which the petitioner was using the booth. Six recordings of approximately three minutes each of petitioner's end of the conversation were obtained and admitted into evidence.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1084. (1961). That statute provides in part:
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a
wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate commerce of bets or
wagers of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting
event or contest, or for the transmission or a wire communication which entitles
the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for informa-

tion assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than
$10,000.00 or imprisoned not more than two years or both.
2. 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir' 1966).
3. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote for the majority. Mr. Justice White wrote a concurring
opinion as did Mr. Justice Douglas with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joined. Mr. Justice
Black dissented. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the decision.
4. 88 S. Ct. at 512.
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Petitioner requested a determination of whether a public telephone
booth fell within the meaning of a "constitutionally protected area" and
whether "physical penetration" of such an area is necessary before a
search and seizure without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority declined to answer petitioner's questions5 as they were addressed to the Court, indicating that
to do so would result in too narrow a resolution of the issues presented.
Mr. Justice Stewart believed that the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to people, not places. While acknowledging that "past cases"
embraced the use of the term "constitutionally protected area" he stated
that the Court has "never suggested that this concept can serve as a
talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem."' Further,
when an individual knowingly exposes a subject, even in the privacy of
his own home,7 he may not avail himself of Fourth Amendment protection, while an individual who has a reasonable expectation of privacy falls
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment even though he is in an
area, much like the phone booth here in question, which is readily accessible to the public.8 Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion would seem
to lend clarity to this proposition. He stated, "I join the opinion . . .
which I read to hold only (a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area
where . . . a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy ...
,,9 In support of Stewart's statement that the
Amendment protects people not places, Harlan asserted that the "question ... is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here,
the answer to that required reference to a place." (Emphasis added.) 10
In refuting the Government's argument that the phone booth was a
"public place" not subject to Fourth Amendment protection, Harlan said,
"the point is not that the booth is 'accessible to the public' at other times
. . . but that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reason5. Id. at 510.
6. See n. 9 at 511 of 88 S. Ct. 507. The "past cases" Stewart referred to are Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 50 (1961); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); and
Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
7. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). This was not an eavesdrop case, but
concerned the admission in evidence of narcotics secured as a result of an undercover agent
being invited to petitioner's home for a sale. Court held that while a house is accorded the
full range of Fourth Amendment protection, when it is turned into a commercial center it
is entitled to "no greater sanctity than if it were . . . a store, a garage, a car or on the
street." 385 U.S. at 210.
8. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960). This case involved a search of the
taxicab in which petitioner was riding and the "seizure" of narcotics dropped on the floor of
the cab allegedly by petitioner. The evidence was excluded since no warrant had been secured
nor was the search incident to a lawful arrest.
9. 88 S. Ct. at 516.
10. Id.
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able." (Emphasis added.)" Thus, the important element as expressed by
both Stewart and Harlan appears to be the "reasonable expectations" of
privacy which an individual attaches to any place he may be at any one
time. The rule is most clearly expressed by Harlan: "My understanding
of the rule .. .is .. .first that a person have exhibited an actual (sub-

jective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ,,2 Having thus
defined the "rule" the Court proceeded to consider the Government's
main argument.
The main contention in the Government's argument was that since the
surveillance technique employed involved no physical penetration of the
telephone booth from which petitioner placed his calls, it should not be
tested by Fourth Amendment requirements. For this proposition the
Government relied heavily, as did the Court of Appeals, upon the decisions in Olmstead v. United States 3 and Goldman v. United States. 4 In
Olmstead the Court held that, in the absence of federal statute, evidence
of a conversation intercepted by tapping petitioner's phone line at a point
outside his home did not fall within the Fourth Amendment protection
against "unreasonable search and seizure." Mr. Justice Taft, speaking for
the five to four majority, stated that "the (4th) Amendment does not
forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure.
The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of house or offices of defendant."' In Goldman,
which is strikingly similar on the facts to the present case, the Government employed two types of electronic surveillance techniques. First, they
unlawfully entered petitioner's office and planted an electronic listening
and recording device inside. The next day, even though the planted microphone did not function properly, the agents were able to hear petitioner's
conversations by the use of another electronic device, a detectaphone
similar to the device in the present case, which the agents placed against
a wall in a room adjoining petitioner's office. The Court distinguished the
two techniques holding that whereas placing the microphone and recording device in petitioner's office constituted a trespass and may have been
violative of petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights, the placing of the
detectaphone against the wall was not a trespass and did not fall under
Fourth Amendment protection.
In the instant case Mr. Justice Stewart conceded that "penetration"
was required under the rule in the two cases just discussed but indicated
that those cases had been decided under the concept that property inter11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 517.
Id. at 516.
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
277 U.S. at 464.
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ests controlled the right of the Government to search and seize and that
the Fourth Amendment covered only tangible property. He cited Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden0 to support the contention that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy
and is not limited to property interests. During the course of its opinion
in Hayden, the Court explained how the shift in emphasis from property
to privacy had developed through a "subtle interplay of substantive and
procedural reform."'" They stated that the Weeks'" decision had established that a defendant could petition for the return of his illegally seized
property before trial. But in Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United States 9
and Gould v. United States2" the petitioner's property had been returned
to them, copies having been retained as evidence by the Government. In
those cases, the Court held that supression might be sought under circumstances which would not sustain an action in trespass or replevin, shifting
the emphasis from protection of property to protection of privacy.
In Katz, Mr. Justice Stewart stated, "[t]he Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the
recording of oral statements overheard without any technical trespass .... ,'21
As authority he cited Silverman v. United States2 in which
conversations were recorded by Government agents who had inserted a
spike which was attached to a microphone, under the baseboard of a room
adjoining petitioner's until it hit a heating duct which acted to transmit
conversation from petitioner's room. While the Silverman Court held that
eavesdropping involving penetration of petitioner's premises was violative
of the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
pointed out "[t]hat case established that interception of conversation
reasonably intended to be private could constitute a 'search and seizure,'
and that the examination or taking of physical property was not required."" He also cited Wong Sun v. United States24 as further support,
stating that it was the first case to hold that verbal statements could be
the "fruits" of an illegal search and seizure.
16. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
17. Id. at 299.
18. Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 382 (1914).
19. 251 U.S. 385 (1919). The Silverthorne case involved unlawful seizure of defendant
corporations books and the making of copies thereof. On the basis of these copies, the district
attorney sought to subpoena defendant to produce the originals. Supreme Court held that the
government could not avail itself of knowledge gotten from an illegal search.
20. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). In this case, a business acquaintance of petitioner's, while on
an apparent social call to petitioner's office, seized and copies papers at the direction of
government agents when petitioner stepped out of his office for a few minutes. Supreme
Court held the search was unlawful regardless of the fact that petitioner had given permission to the acquaintance to enter the office.
21. 88 S. Ct. at 512.
22. 365 U.S. 50 (1961).
23. 88 S. Ct. at 517. See also 40 NORTH CAROLNA L. REV. 115' (1961).
24. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See 77 HAzv. L. REV. 117 (1963).
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The Government further contended that because of the manner in
which the surveillance was conducted the "search and seizure" affected
complied with constitutional standards. Justice Stewart flatly rejected
this contention:
It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint.
Yet the inescapable fact is, that this restraint was imposed by
the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. .

.

. In the ab-

sence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a
search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to
find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined
their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that
end.25
Mr. Justice Stewart indicated that the Government's activities in this
case could have been authorized by the appropriate authority:
It is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed
that a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need
for such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on
which it was to proceed, and clearly appraised of the precise
intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized,
with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure
that the Government asserts in fact took place. 6
To further support his view, Stewart cited Osborn v. United States2 7 and
Berger v. State of New York. 28 In Osborn two judges authorized a witness to secretly record conversations between himself and another. Petitioner sought to exclude the recording from being admitted into evidence.
The Court held the evidence was admissable because of the authorization
of the judges based on "a factual affidavit alleging the commission of a
specific criminal offense . . . for the narrow and particularized purpose
of ascertaining the truth of the affidavit's allegation. 29 In declaring a
New York State wire tapping statute "deficient on its face" in Berger,
the Court stated, "New York's statute lays down no such 'precise and
discriminate' requirements. Indeed, it authorized the indiscriminate use
of electronic devices as was specifically condemned in Osborn."5 0
25. 88 S. Ct. at 513. United States v. Jeffers also held, "Over and again this Court has
emphasized that the mandate of the Fourth Amendment requires reference to judicial process.
In so doing the Amendment does not place an unduly oppressive weight on law enforcement
officers, but merely interposes an orderly procedure under the aegis of judicial impartiality
that is necessary to attain the beneficent purpose intended." 342 U.S. 48 at 51 (1951).

26. 88 S. Ct. at 512.
27.
28.
29.
30.

385
388
385
388

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
US.

323 (1966).
41 (1967).
at 330.
at 58.
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Mr. Justice Stewart, in Katz, concluded, "The Government agents have
ignored 'the procedure of antecedent justification .. .that is central to

the Fourth Amendment,' a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional
precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case.
Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion stated that he was unable to
agree with the majority's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment for
two reasons: (1) the words of the Fourth Amendment do not apply to
non-tangible verbal evidence, and (2) the Amendment should not be
rewritten by the courts to "bring it into harmony with the times"32 just to
reach a result many believe to be desirable.
Black believed that a conversation which is overheard by eavesdropping
whether by wiretapping or plain snooping is not tangible, and under the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment can be neither searched nor seized.
Black stated that this is the first decision that brought "eavesdropping"
within the ambit of Fourth Amendment protection. Olmstead and Goldman are cited to support this premise. He indicated that the decisions in
both those cases rested squarely on the proposition that eavesdropping
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, not on a trespass basis as the
majority had indicated. 3 Black explained that unauthorized intrusion in
search and seizure cases has been determinative of whether the exclusionary rule applied. But he believed that the exclusionary rule formulated in Weeks3 4 rested on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court
over other federal courts and was not rooted in the Fourth Amendment."5
Mr. Justice Black disagreed with the majority's opinion that Olinstead or Goldman had been "eroded" by the Silverman and Hayden decisions. Silverman, he stated, "had expressly refused to re-examine the
rationale of Olmstead or Goldman," 6 and involved an unauthorized intrusion which called into play the "supervisory exclusionary rule of evidence," while Hayden, cited by the majority to show that the Fourth
Amendment applied to "intangibles," upheld the seizure of articles of
clothing which are tangibles. Mr. Justice Black stated that although the
majority opinion indicated that today Olmstead and Goldman are no
longer good law, the fact is that these cases have never been overruled or
even "eroded."
Mr. Justice Black concluded by stating that the Fourth Amendment
protects privacy only in so far as it prohibits unreasonable searches and
31. 88 S. Ct. at 515.
32. Id. at 519.

33. See, 2 DUQUESNE L. REV. 107, which discusses the "trespass doctrine" as it applied
in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
34. 232 U.S. 382 (1914).

35. See Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33
(1949).

36. 88 S. Ct. at 521.
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seizures of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." It can not be extended,
as the Court has done here, to provide a constitutional- right of privacy.
"With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the
Fourth Amendment ....

It was never meant for this Court to have such

power.... )237
In summary, the Supreme Court in this decision has established that it
will no longer determine the scope of Fourth Amendment protection by
tests which are not suited to cope with modern electronic surveillance
techniques. Problems of determining what constitutes "penetration" or
"trespass" or a "constitutionally protected area" should no longer trouble
the Court. Rather, the determination has now become one of deciding the
"reasonableness" of an individual's "expectation of freedom from intrusion." It is suggested that this interpretation indicates that the Court is no
longer concerned with the technical correctness of Fourth Amendment
application, but rather will apply it to secure from governmental invasion
the "zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees.""5 In relation with other Amendments which have been interpreted as broad guarantees of individual freedom,"9 the Fourth Amendment will be employed to develop "the constitutional foundations of a
yearning for 'privacy,' which constitutes a major component of 'the
American dream.' ,40

It must be emphasized that the Court has not turned its back upon the
difficulties of modern day law enforcement, for it clearly indicated that
a wiretapping or an electronic surveillance can be lawfully accomplished
if authorized by a judge or magistrate with prior knowledge of the need
for such investigation and the specific basis upon which it is to proceed.
However, the Court reaffirmed its position that such a search conducted
without a warrant would result in exclusion of evidence gained thereby,
notwithstanding a clear showing of probable cause.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead stated, "in the application
of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but
of what may be. Ways may someday be developed by which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them
in court, and by which it will be able to expose to the jury, the most inti37. Id. at 523.
38. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In striking down a Connecticut
statute which made the use of contraceptives unlawful, Mr. Justice Douglas explained that
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights have "penumbras" which create "zones of privacy." For
example, the First Amendment right of association while not expressly included in the First
amendment is necessary in making the "express guarantees fully meaningful." See Justice
Black's dissenting opinion in which he challenged the Court to place limits on this new
right of privacy which it had created.
39. See, N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), First Amendment; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
40. Dixon, Jr., The GaiswoLD Penumbra: Constitutional Charter jor an Expanded Law
of Privacy? 64 Micn. L. REv. 197 (1965).
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mate occurrence of the home."'" Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Goldman stated that it was the Court's "duty to see that this historic provision
receives a construction sufficiently liberal and elastic to make it serve the
needs and manners of each succeeding generation. 42 The principles decided in this case will help to insure to the present generation, in a period
of increasing technological advancement, the protection from unauthorized intrusion intended by the Framers of the Fourth Amendment.
Jay Paul Kahle

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SELF-INCRIMINATION-An

accused

gambler's

claim of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination provides a
complete defense to federal prosecution for violation of federal tax statutes requiring gamblers to pay excise and occupational taxes.
Marchetti v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968).
Grosso v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 709 (1968).
Convictions, in federal district courts, were secured against petitioners
in Marchetti and Grosso for violations of the Federal Gambling Tax
statutes.' The gambling tax statutes constitute a comprehensive system

of congressional enactments designed for both revenue and regulatory
purposes.2 The statutes levy both a fifty dollar occupation tax (evidenced by a gambling stamp) on those contemplating the conduct of
gambling enterprises, i.e., those persons in the business of accepting
wagers,' and a ten per cent excise tax on the proceeds of such wagering.'
An obligation to pay either of the taxes cannot be satisfied without filing
a special registration statement (occupation tax) or a return (excise tax)
with the Internal Revenue Service. Both the completed registration statement and return contain extensive information relating to the "taxpayer's"
41. 277 U.S. at 474.
42. 316 U.S. at 138.
1. The general provisions of this tax may be found in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4401-23.

Unfortunately, all the pertinent provisions are not collected in one place, but are spread
throughout the Code. As cited in succeeding footnotes, §§ 6107, 6103, 6011, 6653, 6806(c),
7201, 7203, 7262 and 7273(b) must be included to comprehend the terms of the tax more
fully.

2. The wagering tax statutes grew out of the Investigations of Kefauver Crime Committee of the early 1950's. Debate showed the statutes were designed in part as a revenueraising measure. 97 CONG. REC. 6891,

12238 (1951).

Some $115 million has been collected

under the wagering tax statutes since 1953. Yet, the amount of revenue produced by the
taxes has decreased from $10.5 million in the first year of collection to $6.6 million in
fiscal 1965, despite original estimates of $400 million a year. See Caplin, The Gambling
Business and Federal Taxes, 8 CRmAE AND DELINQUENCY 371 (1962); McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 193, 222-3.
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4411.
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4401.

